On June 24 at the State Department, James Rubin was asked about Javier Solana's statement suggesting a change in tactics by NATO. Solana stated that Rugova should begin talks with Milosevic without conditions, unlike Albright's insisting that his refusal to talk was all right so long as Milosevic failed to obey the Contact Group demands.
Rubin said that the original alibi for Rugova stonewalling still applied, adding that "for negotiations to succeed, for us to have a real dialogue, the principal problem must be turned around...the problem posed by the crackdown of Serbian forces." Rubin then mentioned reports that Holbrooke`s convoy had been fired upon; the reports had the shots being fired by the KLA at the Yugoslav army escort: he claimed that "neither he or Ambassador Hill heard any shots or were aware of any shooting near them and there was no action of any significance that he saw in a real time basis. They obviously saw the results of some military action that involved devastation to certain towns. But they did not believe they were in danger, nor did they hear of any shooting."
Rubin was asked about reports that Holbrooke met some KLA members. "I think the idea of a first contact is a vast exaggeration from someone on the ground who observed the fact that Ambassador Holbrooke ran into some fighters, who had KLA patches, who were randomly located in a particular city, who he talked to...
"He did speak to a soldier who had a UCK patch, who described to him the local situation. He was on a fact finding tour, trying to figure out what went on, and spoke to some of those who were in a position to provide facts, or at least their interpretation of the facts to him", said Rubin. So Rubin was told: "Okay, so as you say, he happened along someone with a KLA patch while he was walking through the street, and he.." "Well, now you are making a mockery of it", said Rubin, "and I`m not trying to. He happened upon soldiers who had UCK patches, and talked to them for about 20 minutes; this is what he told me...It was not a political discussion..."
He added that "at the appropriate time we believe it would be important to be in contact with all elements of Kosovar Albanian society." He spoke of the need to deal with "the whole array of Kosovo Albanian society".
He claimed that they had been radicalised by the "stupid mistakes of President Milosevic in alienating the Kosovar Albanian population", adding that "Yesterday, Dr Rugova and Mr Bukoshi and others talked about he need to bring the KLA into their political umbrella. We don`t have a problem with that, frankly, we think that`s fine", but Milosevic`s crackdown, as usual, was standing in the way.
KLA involvement was said to be necessary since the Albanian side would have to be able to "deliver" on an agreement, but that such an agreeement would be a miracle since it would "entail a fundamental change in the policies of Belgrade."
If applied to the Palestine conflict, this argument would be that Hamas has to be a party to negotiations because they are needed to "deliver" peace, that the rise of Hamas is the fault of Israel's radicalising the Palestinian population; actually a reasonable idea in this case of infinitely worse repression and a situation internationalised by Israel's controlling land outside its borders. No one should hold their breath expecting this out of Washington.
When asked if the KLA was a terrorist organisation, Rubin explained that "The definition of a terrorist organisation is a very complex one that requires an elaborate legal justification", and that the commission of terrorist acts by a group does not necessarily make them a "terrorist organisation".
"So attacks on Serbian civilians, if they happen, are not necessarily proof it`s a terrorist organisation?", Rubin was asked.
"Correct", replied Rubin
Rubin was told of reports of "the KLA not being the friendly guerrilla group that it seems to have been painted... that they are pulling elderly Serbs out of their houses and shooting them in the head, for example. Can you address that? Perhaps that Mr Milosevic is somewhat justified in some of his thinking."
Rubin accused Milosevic of "using modern military equipment and sweeping away whole towns and killing people broadly and driving refugees out of whole regions of Kosovo....(that KLA)...incidents that we condemn does not justify a wildly disproportionate, and frankly, self defeating response on the part of President Milosevic".
He was asked: "does it appear that the more radical Kosovars and also engaged in ethnic cleansing?..." He replied; "I have no specific information on the veracity of those reports".
On June 24, t 6:15 pm at a Pristina press conference, Holbrooke claimed that "We're trying to prevent this fighting from escalating into a general war." i
On June 25, Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik announced that his government condemned Haris Silajdzic, co-chairman of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Council of Ministers, for his offering to help NATO stage attacks against Yugoslavia. He described this offer as a violation of the Dayton agreement and a destabilising act, leading to renewed fears of a plan to impose a Unitary Bosnia. He ordered his cabinet to sever all contacts with Silajdzic and expected High Representative Westendorp to condemn Silajdzic and to admit that what he proposed violated the Dayton Agreement.ii
On June 25, Holbrooke decided that after repaying Milosevic's hospitality with insults, and then insulting him further the next day, that he would have the temerity to drop in on him once more. At 8:30 pm, another meeting took place; Holbrooke demanded that Milosevic allow KLA roadblocks on the Pristina-Pec highway to stay up. Deceitfully, he claimed that "We managed to stop a war in Bosnia...and our job now is to prevent a war. And this can be done by yourself." He must have made Milosevic feel very powerful. iii
On June 25, James Rubin confirmed that the next Contact Group meeting was scheduled for July 8 in Bonn. He mentioned the ongoing Holbrooke talks, that Robert Gelbard was in Brussels having discussions with Rugova and Contact Group officials. "Ambassador Holbrooke is in contact with President Milosevic, Ambassador Gelbard is in contact with our allies, as well as Dr Rugova, Mr Bukoshi and others, and Ambassador Hill is in regular contact with both sides"; a "virtual negotiation".
He spoke of "valid reports of fighting in the central areas of Kosovo and many are concerned this violence would move south along the southern border. Clearly, large amounts of territory are controlled by the Kosovo Liberation Army...
"The task we are focused most immediately on is working ...to develop an effective monitoring mission", a "unified mission of Contact Group countries and other countries who are going to be in the region, trying to determine what`s going on...In the course of which, we would expect there to be regular contact with security forces from both sides, including the Kosovo Liberation Army, which controls large amounts of territory." He added that U.S. officials would have many opportunities to meet KLA members "continuously".
Again he claimed that alleged Serb repression made this an "excruciatingly difficult issue" and made more excuses for the KLA and Albanian radicalism in general, excuses that would never be accepted in the case of the Palestinians. Rubin repeated the claim of Milosevic being the father of the KLA, and that because of this, the KLA had to be "part of the equation" of negotiations.."iv
That evening, Holbrooke held a press conference at the Hyatt Regency hotel in Belgrade where he announced the completion of "two sets of meetings with President Milosevic. We deeply regret our defeat (to Yugoslavia) in the World Cup, but it wasn't the biggest surprise in the world."
Late on June 25 and on June 26, the KLA launched several new attacks against Kijevo on the Pristina-Pec road; the KLA siege continued and the village was experiencing food shortages as convoys could not supply the villagev.
On June 26, at about 1:30 p.m, the KLA attempted another invasion of Yugoslavia, timed with an attack on border guards launched from the KLA stronghold of Junik in Kosovo, where Richard Holbrooke had been three days earlier. The KLA carried out a similar attempt at around 2:30 pm, again synchronised with an attack from Junik. Three KLA and 15 horses were killed and many weapons were seized.vi
On June 26, Robert Gelbard met with KLA leaders in Switzerland; leaders of a group he described as "terrorist" in February.
On June 27, Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic said that "NATO's previous threats to RS and the current ones to Serbia are one and the same. It seems that they have not changed their methods."
"At the closure of the 20th century, it is terrible that the 'humanitarian world' speaks about bombing and sanctions... I wonder if they ever stopped to consider how their threats sound at this moment, at the end of the millenium?"
She denounced Haris Silajdzic's recent offer to use Bosnia as a staging area for NATO attacks; "Mr. Silajdzic is acting from the position of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, although he is not entitled to this because it is well known how Bosnia-Herzegovina is described in the Dayton Agreement. His statement does not contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the Balkans."
"Silajdzic does not want peace and now it is possible to see how necessary it was to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities," Plavsic added. vii
On June 27, Richard Holbrooke proclaimed Kosovo to be"only a few steps away from a general war" and once more took the liberty to blame the Yugoslavian side for all that went wrong. On June 28, the KLA attacked the village of Dren near Klina at 7 pm local time. The attack was reportedly repelled by Serb villagers. viii
On June 28, Richard Holbrooke told Swiss television that Robert Gelbard did meet senior KLA officers in Geneva; "I can confirm these contacts took place. But it is not clear yet whether these people have control over the military forces."
An unnamed diplomat added that "We've also had earlier chance encounters with the KLA in Europe." ix
On June 29 at the State Department, Lee McClenny declared that the KLA "has influence on the ground in Kosovo". "By talking to them and by bringing them into the process, we think that improves the chances that the process of diplomacy and negotiation will be successful". He also said that Milosevic would be forced to deal with them because "there are facts on the ground in Kosovo that need to be dealt with". Milosevic, of course, was dealing with those facts on the ground already.
McClenny repeated the claim of Milosevic being the father of the KLA. McClenny admitted that the previous week, "Ambassador Gelbard did speak with senior leaders of the UCK." When asked for more details about the meeting in Switzerland, McClenny pleaded ignorance. He was asked by Barry Schweid about Holbrooke`s encouter with the KLA. McClenny claimed that the encounter happened "in the course of his walking through a village in Kosovo."
He claimed not to know of possible "advance work." "A U.S. representative went into a war zone and just met a couple of people that you all have called terrorists", McClenny was told. McClenny insisted that he encounter was "genuinely spontaneous."
McClenny was asked "what Bob Gelbard meant when he called this group a terrorist organisation, and why you are meeting secretly with them?" McClenny claimed that all Gelbard said was that they had committed "terrorist acts."
"He called them a terrorist organisation", McClenny was told. McClenny complained about these questions: "I don`t think there`s, frankly, any utility in beating this to death...Then why make a big deal?", he asked. He was informed that "The United States used to have a policy of not meeting with terrorist groups".
McClenny asked Schweid what evidence he had that this policy "has gone by the wayside." "Well" said Schweid, "you met secretly with the KLA in Switzerland at a very senior level on your part - very secret, leaked it to a few newspapers afterwards. That`s evidence of a group that you referred to as a terrorist organisation".
"I thought we had dealt with that a couple of days ago", said McClenny. "The Secretary of State declared, through a particular legal process, whether an organisation is a Terrorist Organisation, with a capital T and a capital O. Such a determination has not been made in the case of the KLA, and that`s where it really ends."
Schweid pointed out that "Andrew Young lost his job as Ambassador at the UN just by happening to bump into a PLO official and this is while a campaign to bring a group which has been described as a terrorist group into negotiations". He asked McClenny if a policy shift had taken place. "No, it`s not a policy shift", said McClenny.
Schweid asked: "You want Belgrade to, without any preconditions, stop the fighting and withdraw the troops." "Yes,", said McClenny.
Schweid asked: "Even as these folks gain ground, even as you negotiate with these folks?" McClenny replied that "The fighting continues on the ground", adding that "I don`t know that they`ve made great gains over the last week or month ago."
"But you still want Milosevic to, without precondition, to stop the fighting and withdraw the troops to...the barracks", said Schweid.
"Can we get back to the two meetings?", asked Schweid. "I think we`ve beaten the subject to death", said McClenny.
"Did the two officials who met with these independence leaders...ask them to lay down their arms and agree to a ceasefire?...I know... you`re asking Milosevic (to) stop fighting. In...those two meetings, was the same request made to the..(KLA?)" McClenny replied that "We think everybody should set their weapons down". "But you don`t happen to know if they were told that", said Schweid. "It was a private conversation", claimed McClenny. "
A private conversation?", said Schweid. "The guy`s on the payroll - both of them are government employees. They`re meeting with people who are leaders in a war. And your policy is private in dealing with them, and public when dealing with Belgrade, right?"
"Not always, no", claimed McClenny. "We have quite a few private conversations with Belgrade as well." Schweid asked about the fact that Rugova had "always said that he`s for independence". McClenny claimed that his "actual recollection is different from that", that he would "have to check to be absolutely sure."
"He said autonomy wasn`t enough," said Schweid. "Autonomy covers a wealth of possibilities" claimed McClenny.x
On June 29, at The Hague, former Vukovar mayor Slavko Dokmanovic allegedly committed suicide in his cell. The Yugoslav Justice Ministry announced that it held "the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague accountable for the death of Slavko Dokmanovic." The decision to arrest and try him was a dubious one, and the Tribunal seemed to be in a position where they faced the embarassment of an acquittal. This death conveniently ended that problem.xi
That same June 29, the KLA command near Decani issued a statement claiming that a group of volunteers had arrived from the "enslaved territories" in Macedonia, specifically from the towns of Tetovo and Gostivar.xii
On June 29, Tim Butcher of the London Daily Telegraph claimed that "in a sinister development reminiscent of the war in Bosnia, foreign journalists working in Kosovo have been deliberately shot at by Serb troops and then subjected to an attempted cover-up by the Serb authorities"
He also claimed that "an armoured Land Rover carrying two Danes and a local translator was hit 21 times by small arms fire from Serb positions on a front line 25 miles further west". "There were no warning shots" and "the first shot was aimed at the head of the driver by a Serb soldier less than 15 yards away. The round shattered part of the reinforced windscreen but failed to penetrate.
"The Serbs said they would hold an inquiry, but later claimed "that the vehicle had failed to stop at a checkpoint, had no registration plates, was not marked as a journalists' vehicle and was given plenty of warning shots to stop." This explanation was denounced as "lies" by the foreign correspondent for TV2 Denmark, Niels Brinch.
Butcher also claimed that "Serb forces risked a further escalation of violence in the province by launching an assault against Kosovo Liberation Army rebels who last week seized a mine and took hostages in the town of Belacevac, six miles west of Pristina...:"
"A battle raged all day....the Serb attack appeared to be having its heaviest impact on the town of Ade, where the rebels seized nine hostages last week. Shells could be seen hitting houses held by the KLA." An eight year old was killed by gunfire, but the circumstances of this were not clarified.
He added that the promise by mine directors to liberate it with"a posse of 900" and rescue the hostages was being fulfilled "as men in black masks manned checkpoints leading to the mine. Machine-gun barrels poked from brick walls leading into the area and Serb civilians were seen returning home with new weapons issued by the government. Reporters were threatened with rifle butts and forced to retreat from the scene" .
Tim Butcher also reported a decision made by European Union foreign ministers that the KLA would have to be involved in any peace talks; the legitimisation of the KLA continued.xiii.
On June 29, according to Tanjug, the KLA attacked Serbian homes in the villages of Josnice and Jelovac in Klina. Near Orahovac, 20 KLA attacked the Orvin winery in the village of Sopnik, ejecting 40 workers. The KLA also shelled Decani during the evening; a shell reportedly struck the building where Serb IDPs were staying.xiv
On June 30, "Serbian security forces appeared to have won back control of Kosovo's largest coal mine...after a two-day offensive involving artillery against ethnic Albanian separatists from the Kosovo Liberation Army", Philip Smucker reported. Albanians claimed that four had died in this effort. Tom Walker quoted mine policeman Miodrag Jankovic saying: "We gave the Albanians ten days to get out. Why shouldn't we have one day with tanks?"xv
Smucker added that"The capture by troops from the KLA of the mine that feeds Kosovo's massive power station at Obilic had threatened to do enormous damage to the credibility of the Serb special police units deployed across the region".
Control of the village of Ade was accomplished at midday.xvi "Why the Serbs took so long to recapture a key state asset remains a mystery", Tom Walker reported, "but a senior policeman described how negotiations to free the hostages had broken down." A miner, Nebojsa Jankovic, said: "We've been told they were all executed when the action started." These were the nine hostages taken by the KLA when they captured the mine; later, they were said to still be alive and in KLA captivity.
Walker added that "Veljko Odalovic, Kosovo's Serb Governor, predicted that more Serb offensives will begin soon, among them an operation to retake the Pristina-Pec highway - which would include ending the KLA siege of Kijevo, the police checkpoint and village cited by Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy, as the province's most loaded tripwire".xvii
"There is a growing sense among Serbs that the police and army units are not doing enough to stop the KLA", Walker added. "Miroslav Solevic, self-styled president of the Nis-based Serb Patriots, accused the Government of incompetence, adding that 7,000 Serb civilians were prepared to join the fight for Kosovo".
Vecernje Novosti, a Belgrade newspaper, opined that "more offensives - in particular to liberate the village of Kijevo, surrounded by the KLA for a week", should take place. They asked:. "If Mrs Thatcher could save 200 shepherds on the Falklands, why can't we save 200 Serbs?".xviii
On July 1, James Rubin declared that an "intensive effort" was taking place diplomatically, with Ambassador Hill meeting in Tirana with "relevent officials", Gelbard headed to Bosnia and later to the Contact Group meeting in about a week.
Rubin claimed that this was to achieve "a ceasefire" and "Over the longer term, we need a political solution". This effort would also serve to "deter and prevent the outbreak of a more general war that would redound to the disadvantage of the people living there, as well as harm the interests of our NATO allies and the United States itself." He declared that "we have made clear to various factions within the Kosovo Albanians what a mistake this would be" to employ mercenaries, including Bosnia war veterans. He claimed that any mercenary engagements to the KLA cause "have led to no real effects on the ground in Kosovo."
When someone claimed that Rubin`s initial overview "was devoid of cricisicm of Milosevic and the Serbs", and if this meant that "you are viewing Milosevic and his allies as more or less moral equals with the KLA these days", Rubin said: "On the contrary. The principle responsibility for the current situation lies with Belgrade."
"The central figure that we have expressed our strongest support and understanding for is Dr Rugova", he being "central and indispensable". "That is the reason the President of the United States met with him; that is the reason Secretary of State Albright met with him."
He claimed that to advocate contact with the KLA was to be "realistic", since it was necessary for a cease fire to hold. He claimed the KLA to represent "a large body of opinion in Kosovo Albanian society, and it is our view that all of those opinions ought to be part of the negotiating process, which should be led by... Dr Rugova. He demanded that "a cessation of hostilities would include the kind of change in force structure and force deployment, including the return to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro the forces there".
He claimed that Milosevic was being blamed because "he is responsible for the decision of the government there to use military force... he`s got to begin by pulling back those forces. If he wants to change the views of the International Community about sanctions and other matters, that is still an absolute requirement."
Rubin confirmed that the Contact Group statement "which raised the threat of possible NATO military actions" demanded that the demands be obeyed "simultaneously and immediately." When asked if Milosevic was expected to do anything different by July 8, Rubin declared that "The Contact Group will meet. The NATO military planners continue to accelerate military planning. We haven`t ruled any options out. We are supportive of a strong resolution in the United Nations, authorising the use of force" though "it may not be necessary", though "we would like to see a strong UN resolution put forward...and we would like to see support for it."
Rubin said that fighting around the coal mine had ended,with "minimal collatoral damage there".
When asked if President Milosevic enjoyed sovereignty over "his entire nation", if "legally speaking, is there any reason that President Milosevic doesn`t have the rights of a president over his entire nation" including "the ability to deploy military force, to make foreign policy...". Rubin replied that "We do not ...believe it`s a simple question of what a sovereign may do inside his territory."
He claimed that the arms embargo was proof that "there are consequences internationally for was is going on there" that "the International Community believes..., that it has a right to make decisions to protect international peace and security there...
"With the exception of Russia, the Contact Group has imposed economic sanctions on President Milosevic for doing things within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia..."
He added that "We do expect to act within a NATO context" and are "planning through NATO to proceed". Since"there has been a Security Council resolution already making clear of the dangers", that "the Contact Group countries have made clear that this is a danger to international peace and security, and NATO`s charter talks about the need to act,...in the contexts of dangers to Europe", this meant that there were "well established principles" allowing for an attack against Yugoslavia:
"Some may disagree, but they are not invented for the convenience of the United States(!)." When asked about Sandy Berger saying that "NATO is ready to intervene", Rubin said that merely "NATO is actively and aggressively and on an accelerated basis, preparing plans for possible decisions by decision makers."xix
On July 2, «the Albanian press noted mysterious flights by U.S. military cargo planes, flying into Albania without reporting their presence», noted Gregory Elich. He quoted the two newspaper reports; «An average of two U.S C-130 military aircraft have landed daily at Gjadar». Elich suggested that these were transporting arms and equipment for the KLA. xx
On July 2, James Rubin claimed that if the Albanians continued to seek independence, "they will only decrease the chances of improving their autonomy and improving their lives". "Similarly, if President Milosevic doesn`t finally get the message that the cracking down on the Kosovar Albanians is only making is impossible for his country to be rehabilitated and making it impossible for his own people to operate in Kosovo, which is increasingly controlled...some third of the territory, by the Kosovar Liberation Army."
He claimed that Ambassadors Gelbard, Holbrooke and Hill would work "with Slobodan Milosevic and with Dr Rugova" to "convince them that their maximal objectives and continued pursuit of them are going to redown to the disadvantage harm of their people." When asked about meetings with the KLA, Rubin said that it "would be foolhardy for us not to realise that the necessities of a ceasefire require discussions with those who are...in a position to enforce and implement such a cease fire." Thus more meetings were in order.
He claimed that he hoped that the newly established Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) monitors would commune often with the KLA, and that "the purpose of our contact that Ambassador Gelbard undertook was to make them understand that there were limits to what they could expect from the International Community and the importance of a ceasefire." When asked if KLA had agreed to ensure the security of KDOM personnel, he said "I`m not going to be in a position to comment on the discussions that were had of that kind."xxi
Early on July 3, the siege of Kijevo was broken. That evening, Richard Holbrooke once again visited Belgrade where he met Presidents Milosevic and Milutinovic. The next day, he met with Ibrahim Rugova, Adem Demaci and Rezdep Qosja of the Albanian Democratic Movement.
On July 4, the KLA abducted three Serbs near the villages of Movljane and Recane in the Suva Reka municipality..The KLA later attacked Movjlane using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. The abducted Serbs were released the next day.
On July 5, The Times of London reported that "A senior commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) revealed for the first time last week that his forces plan to fight for the creation of a 'greater Albania'. It would unite ethnic Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania".
The unnamed commander was asked if the "KLA believed that the areas of Macedonia and Montenegro where Albanians predominate should be incorporated into a 'greater Albania'". His answer:"They are our people as well, our country, and we do expect for them to integrate with Albania, together with Kosovoxxii."
On July 5, Stojan Jovic, a Yugoslav «special units expert», claimed that, as Gregory Elich put it, «the entire Kosovo-northern Albania operation was 'being carried out by American Green Berets' and that the KLA had 'intelligence support' from NATO's South Wing Headquarters in Naples. KLA fighters, he said, 'maintain satellite contacts with U.S. intelligence agents who conduct aerial surveillance...' ». xxiii
On July 5, Vojislav Seselj visited Gorazdevac and Pec. A few kilometres north, near Istok, the KLA attacked Serbian houses in the village of Belica. In Belgrade, Richard Holbrooke visited Slobodan Milosevic once again.
In a July 6 interview with Der Spiegel, the KLA`s Jakub Krasniqi proclaimed that «collaborators are warned that we will kill them if they continue to follow the wrong path». Krasniqi also admitted that half of the KLA at the time were from abroad.. xxiv
On July 6, the first patrol of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission was carried out with a tour of the "ruined villages" of the Drenica. The patrol included "the Russian and British ambassadors to Belgrade and the American charge d'affaires". Richard Holbrooke declared that "These patrols will become routine." xxv Philip Smucker reported from Prekaz that "American officials said they had failed to broker a ceasefire between Albanian rebels and Serb security officials over the weekend".
According to Smucker, "Serb officials reported that two Serb police officers were killed by 'Albanian extremists'... and several more wounded in a gunfight just two miles from the second largest city in Kosovo", Pec. Unnamed "Western witnesses" claimed that "armed Serbian police patrols (were) firing randomly into Albanian villages" and that "Armed rebels responded and the fighting has moved to within two miles of the ancient city of Pec"...xxvi
The Christian Science Monitor reported that "According to a KLA fighter in Lodza, the fighting near Gorazdevac began when members of the KLA approached the house of a Serb and asked him to surrender his arms. "[The Serb] let them into the house and then opened fire," says the KLA fighter, who identified himself as Mehdi. "Two of our men were killed as they tried to run." xxvii
Albania's ARTA news agency, however, claimed that some Serbs from Gorazdevac and Pec decided to drink and celebrate Vojislav Seselj's visit; some armed Serbs were allegedly escorted by police to a nearby village to capture one KLA man. He was shot, and supposedly this caused Albanian villagers to immediately barricade themselves as these alleged paramilitaries roamed the town.
Hearing of this, the KLA would not stand for this violation of their honour and sent 5,000 of them to that village to confront the Serbs. Someone claimed that "police and armed civilians had entered the village, as the Albanian population began to flee, leaving the village to KLA units... The fighting became more intense as KLA surrounded the village. KLA...killed at least 12 ...until Serb army units arrived...(as did)... helicopters, which evacuated the victims and the wounded"; thus, a Great KLA Victory.xxviii
On July 6, Vojislav Seselj was in Pristina. "Richard Holbrooke's mission is not welcome", he said. "I am not interested in them at all. As for American diplomats, and others, the Serbian people is aware that they cannot expect anything good from them...When Holbrooke met with Albanian terrorists, he de-stabilized Rugova's position, who now talks only about the independence of Kosovo, even though he used to be ready for a more rational solution before."
"Holbrooke is unwanted", Seselj added, "for me personally and for the Radical Party". NATO "might send their troops if we guarantee not to attack them, but we say that we will shoot at every foreign soldier that comes to Yugoslavia".
Seselj also asked: "If activities of the terrorist so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo continue, and the authorities continue to show restraint and tolerance, can we exclude the possibility that Serbs form their own army?" xxix
On July 6, James Rubin was asked if the diplomats going to Metohija were in danger because the KLA did not join in negotiations with Holbrooke. He replied that Milosevic "had made a commitment to allow this" and thus was responsible.xxx
On July 7, James Rubin described Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenka as "an authoritarian dictator, who does not know the difference between right and wrong."
Rubin spoke about the Kosovo Observer Mission "to observe and report on the general freedom of movement throughout Kosovo"; a result of previous Contact Group demands. "Their mandate is to observe and report so that next time, if there is a problem, we have accurate independent information that can be the basis for the International Community making decisions"..
The chief of Mission would be Richard Miles; a centre in Pristina would be set up with embassies participating, each controlling its own people. Rubin claimed that a problem in the negotiations was the "radicalisation on the part of the Kosovar Albanians".
The Contact Group "is going to try...to come to some agreement on what the objectives ought to be for this negotiated outcome, and talk a little bit about modalities for achieving those objectives." The Hill-Albanians and Hill-Milosevic meetings would yield a report to help them in making such plans. He spoke again of threatening planning; "But in the meantime, we`re focused on this negotiated outcome, and it`s going to be long, hard slogging." When asked what would "take for the United States to push NATO to intervene militarily", Rubin said that this was a matter for Clinton, that this was "a case where planning for the use of force is justified."
When asked how military intervention could be justified, he claimed that a possible refugee problem could provide such an excuse: "This is not the first time the International Community has regarded the destabilisation created by refugees as justification if appropriate for the use of force." He also claimed that the security of Europe was at stake. The best argument for that is the case of the yet to be reversed Israeli ethnic cleansing of 1948 which had destabilised neighbouring countries for the past 50 years, caused a devastating civil war in Lebanon, and made that region synonymous with war and terrorism.
When someone erroneously credited Ambassador Hill for Gelbard`s calling the KLA a "terrorist organisation", Rubin said, "Neither ambassador wants to be credited with that statement".Rubin added that "there have been acts committed by people affiliated in some way or another with the Kosovar Liberation Army that we have condemned ...and, in a specific sense, could be considered terrorist acts...".
That is not the same as...a terrorist organization. That is not our view of the KLA; it never has been....It is our view that those affiliated with the KLA are engaged in an insurgency, and they are trying to win back freedoms that were lost during the crackdown by the Serbian authorities and were lost by the stripping of the autonomy of the people of Kosovo. But in so doing, they are declaring an objective that ...is simply not going to happen; that is the independence of Kosovo."xxxi
On July 7, Richard Holbrooke told the PBS Newshour that "the big development the last two days was that after years of obstruction, the government in Belgrade agreed to an international diplomatic observer mission, which we organized together with the Russians and the British, and which went out yesterday for the first time ...."
"I saw President Milosevic the day before yesterday, and he reaffirmed his readiness to negotiate with the Albanians." He then blamed Milosevic for allegedly plotting to undermine Rugova's authority and boost that of the KLA.
"I met with several Albanian leaders in Kosovo who said their goal is an independent Kosovo, their goal is to recreate the Greater Albania that existed briefly during the 30's and 40's, which includes Albania, Kosovo, and part of Macedonia. That...would unravel Southeastern Europe and dramatically increase the chances of a general war."xxxii He later admitted that the "Albanian paramilitary" had "started to take Serb hostages" which showed him to be ignorant since the KLA had taken such hostages for some time.
On July 7, Larry King asked Albright about Holbrooke being " quite familiar with - the Serbian question?" Albright replied that though "Kosovo is a part of Yugoslavia", this did not matter since "President Milosevic in effect took away the autonomy of Kosovo, that`s how this whole mess started. Milosevic has to be made to understand that he is the basic one at fault". Still, "violence in the region is not going to solve the problem", which is why Holbrooke was being sent there.
When asked if she was optimistic, Albright said that she was, though it was too strong a word to use at this time. "This is a very difficult situation. The fact that the Kosovars have systematically robbed of their autonomy is something that is exciting extremists. And Milosevic, by his actions, is in fact the best recruiter for extremists on the Kosovar side."xxxiii
On July 8, according to Philip Smucker, "Marauding gangs of Serbian citizens and Albanian rebels have divided Pec into ethnic ghettos". "Thousands of citizens have fled or have been forced at gunpoint to abandon their homes this week, according to residents, officials and human rights workers. At a Serbian checkpoint on the edge of the city, residents armed with grenades and assault rifles, glared at their Albanian neighbours".
He added that "Earlier in the week, several Serbian policemen from the region were killed in fighting nearby and the corpses of several more lie rotting in a no-man's-land between the front lines".
One local Serb "attacked Slobodan Milosevic...for what he said was a policy to abandon Kosovo's Serbs who make up less than 10 per cent of Kosovo's population. He said: "If they wanted to clean those terrorists out, they could do it in 10 minutes with the military."
Local Albanians claimed that the fighting began on July 5, "when Serbian citizens, following an entourage led by Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serb Radical Party, began firing into Albanian villages around Pec." Later, Seselj "called on Kosovo's Serbs to organise themselves in paramilitary units."
Smucker described "Mr Seselj", the "deputy prime minister in a coalition government with President Milosevic's Socialist Party" as a. "bull-necked and bespectacled professor" who "led Serb paramilitary units in Croatia and Bosnia" and boasted "that his men had put out the eyes of their enemies with rusty spoons".xxxiv
"Rusty spoons were mentioned on 'Minimaxovision', a satirical show", Seselj explained in a March 1996 interview published in Vreme. "And they were not directed at anyone in particular. It was a reply to a direct question, 'you Chetniks are slaughtering people again?' I said, of course, only that we have changed our methods; now, instead of knives, we use shoe horns (shoe spoons in Serbo-Croatian). And rusty ones at that, so that it cannot be established whether the victim died because of butchering or from tetanus. It was clear that I was trying to satirise the whole thing."xxxv
On July 8, James Rubin admitted that "we provide about $7 million to Belarus, but all of this goes to the non-state sector - independent media, NGOs, and other organisations supporting the development of a civil society", evidence of another attempt to absorb a European country into the Euro-Atlantic Empire.
About the Contact Group meeting, Madeleine Albright was briefed by Robert Gelbard; "The... discussion was about establishing some general principles that could guide the two parties in negotiating an outcome that would avoid the threat of conflict and the possibility of a wider war", and to this alleged end,
"The United States had put some principles forward in a letter from Ambassador Gelbard to his counterparts in the last few days." He said that the idea would be "short of independence" but "far better than the stripped autonomy and lack of rights the Kosovar Albanians have".
When asked about a New York Times report about Kosovo`s mines being a reason for all of this, he replied: "I suspect that`s more a need for a journalist to have a lead to go to a mine. We don`t think this is about mines. This is about the...autonomy of the people of Kosovo that was stripped away from them many, many years ago. ..to suggest that this is about mines and not the political rights of the people of Kosovo is ridiculous."
"To suggest...that the people of Kosovo are prepared to fight and die across the whole area of Kosovo (not true,) because they are afraid of losing a mine, I think, is ridiculous." Later he said: "I`m not dismissing it as a factor, but to suggest that this is what this conflict is about is wildly exaggerated.".
Rubin did say that "Along with autonomy goes some ability to have control over local resources.... But to suggest that the conflict and the fighting and the dying that`s going on there is over a mine is...looking for another different version of the same story to write again..."
Rubin reaffirmed his alleged claim that independence was not the solution to "this kind of problem where rights of Kosovar Albanians have been stripped". After making the usual claims of how Milosevic radicalised the populace and thus promoted the entry of "rogue elements" into Kosovo, he declared that "there is a territory called Serbia-Montenegro, and we don't, as a matter of principle, support breaking up countries unless there is a really good reason(!)"
Rubin added that "the thing that the Contact Group has made clear is not so much why the Kosovar Albanians shouldn`t use force but why President Milosevic...is the cause of the problem... what is mportant is that we start from an understanding of what caused the problem."
He repeated his claim that the KLA, though at times committing terrorist acts, was not a terrorist organisation; "We regard it as an insurgency that is using force to respond to the stripped autonomy - to the lack of autonomy that President Milosevic took away from them. That is our view on this organisation and I hope that if can be reflected on how it`s reported."
He said of Albanian negotiators that "we think the table would include a wide cross-section of Kosovar Albanian opinion; and whether it`s direct or indirect ought to be up to Dr Rugova, not us" Though there were concerns about the KLA and that they were "part of the problem", the "primary problem" was considered to be in Belgrade.
Rubin claimed that "we still...don`t have evidence that the Kosovar Albanians have welcomed...mercenaries into their ranks." When told that KLA training camps were specifically mentioned in the Contact Group communiqué, Rubin said, "I think they said they have a responsibility to avoid violence and all armed activities", and later about the camps: "I don`t see that, we can talk about that afterwards."
When asked about a possible deadline for NATO military attacks, Rubin said that "military planning" is "increasingly focused and options are being narrowed down and fleshed out". He denied that "we are urging that the KLA have a seat at the table", adding that "it`s accurate to say that the population has been radicalised by the use of force by President Milosevic and to say that Rugova was "being rejected I think is an exaggeration."xxxvi
On July 8, Judge Louise Arbour of the ICTY declared that it had authority to investigate the activities in Kosovo and Metohija.xxxvii On July 9, the OSCE parliamentary assembly urged more drastic sanctions against Yugoslavia as long as Yugoslavia "uses its repressive actions in Kosovo."xxxviii
On July 10, Anthony Loyd reported that "Overwhelmingly, it is the Serbs who are" "relinquishing their positions to their opponents" as "Foreign observers estimate that more than 30 per cent of Kosovo's 200,000 Serbs have left the province. Meanwhile, thousands from Kosovo's Albanian diaspora are returning to fight".
Thus, "the Serb population is isolated and afraid". A Pristina Serb said; "I was relocated here with my family after we fled Knin. I have sent my wife and children back to Belgrade. It won't be long before I am forced to join them."
Loyd added that "Contrary to widespread perceptions, the Yugoslav security forces are operating with considerable restraint in combating the KLA. At times the military seems to be avoiding confrontation and the focus of real fighting is in the mountainous border region".
The day he arrived in Suva Reka, he witnessed a drive-by shooting;"A yellow car pulled up in the centre of town and riddled an approaching vehicle driven by the policeman before accelerating away." As a result, "The policeman was wounded in the shoulder, while an Albanian vendor in a street stall behind him took the force of the fire, dying in a confetti of blood, lead and shredded newspaper".
Following that, "The streets were empty...As special police, laden with weapons, ran down either side of the road to take up positions facing the Albanian quarter, doors and windows slammed shut behind them like falling dominos.
"It seemed probable that these men would begin venting their rage on the Albanians. Yet they did nothing."
According to one of the international observers in Pristina, "The Serb forces are really hamstrung." "They are capable of cracking down on the KLA in the forested border areas, but they are very confused as to what to do in the interior. If they come down heavily on the KLA in these areas, it will only exacerbate their problems and possibly bring down airstrikes by the West if many civilians are killed."
Meanwhile, "more than 90 per cent of their armour and artillery sit idle in garrisons. The KLA, which holds more than a third of the province, grows stronger by the day, and more confident as Serb morale declines". xxxix
On July 11, "thousands of ethnic Albanians and Serbs attempted to flee Kosovo's second city, Pec,...as Serbian forces pummelled a rebel stronghold on its outskirts". This, wrote Philip Smucker, "comes amid signals that the Kosovo Liberation Army plans to take its battle for independence to the province's major cities." He admitted that "The KLA...rejected Western calls for a ceasefire again last week".
"Grenades and heavy artillery, fired from a Yugoslav army base in the south of the city, echoed through the walled streets of Pec as trucks carrying Serb soldiers in black masks raced through this once-tranquil ethnically-mixed city", he claimed.
As a result, "panicking Serbs and Albanians, carrying their life possessions, fought for seats on buses leaving for Montenegro...Albanians in the mixed suburb of Brzenik in Pec fled their homes".
He claimed that special policemen entered the battle with British "Land Rovers pulling artillery pieces" "followed by a Dutch armoured personnel carrier", allegedly "stolen from peacekeepers in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995".
He repeated claims that "the special Serb Anti-Terrorist forces were maltreating older Albanians as they took up positions around the town of Lodja.", that "Yugoslavia's most polished security forces", "based outside Pec in the town of Dubrava" stand accused "of some of the war's worst atrocities, including a recent massacre in the town of Lubinic". One Albanian claimed that "They strip their victims, stab and often mutilate them beyond recognition."
"On the edge of town, Serb civilians manning checkpoints shouted threats at reporters to go no further. They said that Albanian snipers were firing down a dirt road leading to Lodja", Smucker added.
One fleeing woman said: "I think the KLA will attack Pec."xl
On July 11, "Serbian police regained...control of the Pec-Gorazdevac road in Serbia's southern Province of Kosovo-Metohija, representatives of the Pec municipality told the Pristina-based Media Centre", Tanjug reported.
That morning, police undertook "an action to free police officers Srdjan Perovic and Milorad Rajkovic, reported missing following a clash with armed ethnic Albanians in the Lodja village a few days ago", Tanjug added. xli
On July 11, the New York Times' Chris Hedges reported that "Separatist rebels have acquired arsenals of antitank and antiaircraft weapons that are shifting the balance of power in the ethnic war in Kosovo Province », and has « probably ensured that the conflict will last for months if not years."
An unnamed Western diplomat claimed that "The military balance has changed dramatically", that "Any (NATO) intervention would only assist a rebel force that, at this point, needs no assistance." Admitting to the "weapons smuggled over the border from Albania", Hedges wrote that "there has been a noticeable proliferation of rocket-propelled grenades and the highly accurate German antitank weapon known as the Armbrust."
"The Kosovo Liberation Army... is apparently blessed with large sums of money sent by ethnic Albanians overseas, an inexhaustible supply line over the mountains from Albania and thousands of recruits. Rebel soldiers...pull thick wads of German marks from their pockets".
Helping them were former Yugoslav soldiers and mercenaries. "The commander in Smonica", a former Yugoslav officer known as Besnik, commanded a "force of several hundred fighters" that "has steadily increased the territory under its control, often by moving forward a few hundred feet or yards each night, moves that have persuaded the Serbs to retreat each time".
Hedges described "an increasingly military feel to rebel-held areas, with the unkempt civilian soldiers of a month ago being replaced by men who report on walkie-talkies to commanders and move in columns or groups of several hundred". Despite this, "The Western alliance has warned Belgrade that it might carry out air strikes unless Belgrade removes its special police forces and military".
He described the Smonica KLA camp being over a hill off the main road, that "They have taken the hilltop villages of Nec and Ramoz north of Djakovica, giving them positions over the city. They have also taken towns, including Lodja, south of Pec. Rebel barricades have once again closed the road to Kijevo, which was opened by the Serbs a week ago. A three-day government attack to drive rebels from an open-pit coal mine five miles from Pristina has seen Serb forces enter the town, but the mine remains closed because of constant rebel sniper fire on police positions". "Belgrade, in a desperate attempt to stanch the rebel advances, has been pounding border villages like Junik with heavy artillery in the last three days", Hedges added. This is an example of articles claiming a KLA victory to be inevitable.xlii
On July 11, Macedonian President Kiro Gilgorov announced that his country was not to be used a a staging ground for NATO attacks against Yugoslavia.xliii Also , KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi explained the KLA's use of the fascist-era clenched-fist salute, declaring that "a fist is a symbol of unity and strength." .xliv
On July 12, at 11 pm, KLA attacked the police station in Stari Trg near Kosovska Mitrovica. They later withdrew to Mt Salja. Again, this shows the widening of the KLA's geographical scope as the mines near Kosovska Mitrovica were coming under threat.xlv
On July 13, Rubin was asked about news of European Union alarm at "growing support for armed Kosovo Albanians." A Foreign Minister from the EU was said to have called for pressure to be put on the KLA "as a growing radicalisation can be detected". When asked the U.S. view of all of this, Rubin said that "Our view has not shifted".
Mentioning "sporadic fighting...primarily in the areas of Decani and Pec" and the accompanying problems with food deliveries, he reported of talks that took place in Belgrade on July 10 between Ambassador Hill and the Serbs, and in Pristina between Hill and Rugova-led Albanians on the 11th. He made the usual claim of Milosevic`s "primary responsibility".
He said that the "extremists" needed to "realise that their independence goals are not going to be achieved" that the "International Community is not going to support independence for Kosovo; that the International Community is never going to support a Greater Albania." That Rugova and those not branded by Rubin as "extremists" share these positions seems to be of no importance.
He went on about how Kosovo independence was not "realistic" and again blamed Milosevic for allegedly promoting that point of view.
When asked if there were plans to apply some sanctions against Albania "since sanctions against Belgrade didn`t give us any results", Rubin said that "in practice actions don`t always immediately cause results. We`ve put very stiff sanctions in place, and it has helped to bring home to President Milosevic the error of his ways...With respect to the Kosovar Albanians, there is an embargo on arms going into Kosovo which has an effect on them. So there is, in that sense, a sanction already in place."xlvi
At a July 15 Pentagon background briefing, it was said that until July 1, "we know that the UCK...had made some significant advancements because they were previously operating primarily...in the western part of Kosovo." After "the air power demo on the 15th of (June)...they started moving their operations to the east. The most significant gains being this control of a small town...Kijevo" and "most notably, the coal mines located...in the vicinity of ... Belecevac.... located ...less than ten kilometers from Pristina." After the Serb side re-took the mines, they "a couple of days" later, proceeded to "muster up forces and actually move in from the west to retake...Kijevo."
In later fighting around Kosovska Mitrovica, there were "significantly lower levels of activity in terms of... exchanges of fire by these sides than what we were seeing prior to the Belecevac and Kijevo actions by the Serb forces".
As for the number of KLA, the "current estimate ...is around 2,000. ". The briefer claimed to have no knowledge of mercenaries on the KLA side.
He also claimed that "the growth of this organization has been so explosive in the last six months...The reports that we have suggest that the largest amount of the funding is coming from the outside, from Albanian expatriots in Europe and North America...We actually have a hard time ...understanding exactly who is in charge, who is in charge of the military, who's in charge of the politics"
He added that "We know part of their plan has to be to keep this insurgency in the news, to keep it being discussed. That creates pressure not only on Milosevic, but supplies fuel for the International Community to try to resolve this particular problem area. There's certainly a conscious effort on their part to keep this thing alive, so there will continue to be the sporadic outbursts of activity to put pressure on Milosevic and the International Community".
Someone pointed out that "Given the situation on the ground now as you've described it...it appears that the Kosovo Liberation Army is as much the problem as Milosevic's heavy handed tactics".
He said that "the intelligence community would agree that over the past two to three weeks we've seen a definite leveling off and perhaps even drop in offensive type of operations on the part of the Serbs. So clearly following the Milosevic/Yeltsin meeting on 16 June, which actually kind of marked that drawdown in activity, clearly Milosevic is thinking about all of this".
Of the KLA, "They're expanding their ops now...so their growth will continue to expand as they go into new areas and get new recruits. Also they're getting better training from a variety of sources and more equipment of a more lethal nature in the country. So their growth will be better here in the next campaign..".
When asked of "reports that they've been seeking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons...and that the KLA actually acquired a few", "that they have acquired radios, a significant number of them, and that some of the voices heard on those radios were speaking Swiss/German", he said that this could not be confirmed.
Of KLA training, "It appears that some of the members of the UCK have come back from Western Europe and North America... or may have been ...former military personnel in the old Yugoslav Army". "For the most part they're going to be successful as long as the Serb forces don't decide to be more serious about cracking down on them, or more effective at effecting their ability to gain access to weapons".
He added that "The Serbs have done, overall, to date, rather poorly. They have not contained the growth of the UCK. So it appears there is no military solution to the conflict". It was pointed out that "Serb forces can't crack down... They're constrained somewhat right now by the threat of NATO intervention?"
"Yes", was the answer, "But also they don't have really enough people down there in country to contain this large-scale insurgancy."
He added that "this is a classic insurgency. There's a lot of cells out there, they depend on local support in villages". However, "in the face of determined Serb operations the KLA has not shown yet that they're capable of holding ground... Don't confuse the KLA with any kind of an organized military force."
"They hold the ground because the Serbs are allowing them to hold the ground", he added. "With 10,000 army and fewer than 10,000 MUP "from the traffic cops to cops on the beat to paramilitary forces who are now trying to contain the UCK", the Yugoslavs have "no more than 20,000 people overall, and you can see that's not enough to contain the large scale UCK movement down there."
These 20,000 were said to be mostly "just self defense village fighters... If you lump in everything, every arms supporter, every ethnic Albanian arms supporter in Kosovo you're probably talking tens of thousand, 20, 30,000."
"It has obviously evolved since" March "where we have a more robust insurgency and they've (the Contact Group) had to factor in realizations that it can't be a one-sided view of only targeting the Yugoslav military. Then you have to look at what are the possible unintended consequences of that."
On July 15, James Rubin was asked about a Defence Department experts panel earlier that day that concluded that since Milosevic went to Moscow, "there hasn`t been the kind of Serb offensive that was so indeed so offensive and so damaging", that "the Serbs have been laying off somewhat".
Rubin claimed that what he knew of the briefing was "ever so slightly different" than what was described. "Just ever so slightly... I indicated for to you about a week ago that it is correct that there has been some modification in Serb activity, and that the kind of massive crackdown that we saw has not recurred" but "President Milosevic is still President Milosevic and he is still pursuing policies that are reprehensible and ill advised, the way he did in Bosnia".
He recognised that there were differences: "Bosnia was a country that was recognised by the International Community...."
Rubin added that in Kosovo "The people there have every right to be very, very angry at the Serb authorities who have stripped them of their legitimate rights. We support their legitimate rights and we want to see fundamental changes in the way Yugoslavia is made up..."
In other words, a big "Not good enough". Nothing the Serbs can do can every appease James Rubin and the other Albright`s Raiders.
About the proposed International Criminal Court, Rubin said that "we do want to create a successful and effective International Criminal Court", but "We are, however, a global power; we have forces deployed around the world", and "As a global power...we have Special Reponsibilities that many other governments don`t have. We take those responsibilities very seriously; and we try to make sure that any proposals that are put forward with respect to this court don`t impinge on these responsibilities; and if they do, they would obviously effect those responsibilities." If the court does not take the "special global responsibilities" into account, "we will not support" that court.xlvii
On July 16, at midnight, the KLA launched a larger attack against the Stari Trg mine area near Kosovska Mitrovica. About an hour later, the KLA struck in Seciste near Urosevac, another extension of their geographical scope. Also, at 1:30 pm, a police patrol in Prizren was attacked; the KLA withdrew to nearby villages. This also marked an escalation in this conflictxlviii.
On July 16, Rubin acccused the Yugoslavs of "heavy handed police intimidation" when the Serbian police "were present in force"as they entered LDK headquarters/ "Kosova" parliament and "searched through party files. He claimed this to be "emblematic of the repressive nature of Slobodan Milosevic`s regime in Kosovo", which are the kinds of "mistakes" which allegedly led to the creation of the KLA and would make a political settlement more difficult. "If Belgrade is ever going to be able to benefit the Serbs in Kosovo or its country in general, they have to learn to change their tactics".
He mentioned that the Albanian prime minister said that there were 16,000 to 20,000 refugees, which Rubin said caused "a grave risk of destabilisation". "It is not our understanding that the refugee flow has increased", said Rubin. He claimed that fighting was happening in the Decani and Pec regions.
When asked if the Defence briefing of the last day suggested that NATO was no longer considering military action because of the lack of fighting in Kosovo, Rubin said that after having checked with Albright, "nothing has changed. NATO continues to pursue an accelerated military planning...no option has been ruled out."
He was asked about Javier Solana mentioning that one plan was to have NATO occupation of Kosovo to enforce a peace agreement, and whether the U.S. was planning to participate in such an occupation. He confirmed that planning for a possible occuaption was taking place.
When told about the Defence planning denying the existence of mercenaries in Kosovo, Rubin agreed, mentioning that "We have made clear to the Kosovar Albanians what a dumb idea it would be to accept such assistance. And we`re not aware of evidence that such assistance has been accepted and delivered and operating now."
When asked if satellites were being used to enhance the work of KDOM, Rubin said "Is today the day to try to trick the spokesman?" Rubin said he was not aware of any "fundamental change in the refugee or internal displaced person situation. Most of that happened several weeks ago. At low levels it continues."xlix